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This paper adopts a novel approach to studying the evolution of interest rate term
structure over the U.S. business cycles and to predicting recessions. Applying an ef-
fective algorithm, I classify the Treasury yield curve into distinct shapes and find the
less frequent shapes intrinsically linked to the recessions in the post-WWII data. In
forecasting recessions, the median-short yield spread trumps the long-short spread for
horizons up to 17 months ahead and the yield curve shape is nearly impressive as the
median-short spread. Overall, the yield curve shape is an informative but more succinct
indicator than the spreads in studying the term structure.
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1 Introduction
Pioneering studies on the interest rate movements dates back to Macaulay (1938) at the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). About three decades later, the classical
monograph of Kessel (1965) became the first work to characterize term structure patterns
over the U.S. business cycle after the WWII and he proposed the liquidity preference and
expectations hypothesis as the theory underneath. Since then, term structure has been
the research hotspot in finance and macroeconomics. While most of the theoretical and
empirical inquiries were directed to the expectations hypothesis, applying the yield curve
to macroeconomic forecasting had not shown its power until the late 1980s (Laurent, 1988;
Harvey, 1988; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). Since then, the predictive strength of the
yield spread has become a “stylized fact” among macroeconomists and market participants
(Wheelock and Wohar, 2009). The literature is still growing and beyond enumeration.
Along the lines, this paper studies the U.S. term structure fluctuations and its predictive
power of recessions, contributing to the literature in a number of initiatives. Methodologi-
cally, it designs an effective classification algorithm for the Treasury yield curve and makes
available a new indicator of the term structure. Second, it traces the evolution of the yield
curve and characterizes its business cycle patterns. Third, it applies the yield curve shape
in forecasting recessions and evaluates its performance relative to the term spreads.
Aside from measuring cross-sectional yields directly, this paper condenses the entire yield
curve information into a categorical shape variable and traces its evolution over the business
cycles. Since the upward-sloping yield curve is the most frequent shape, other yield curves
can be defined as the minor shapes of less frequencies. The principal findings are: 1) The
minor shapes tend to cluster before and in recessions; 2) the recession-related shape signals
are time-varying in their timing and strength; 3) the duration of a recession is positively
related to the density of the minor shapes; 4) the pre-recession shape signals become more
monotonic and evident after the 1980s. Feeding the Treasury yield curve shape into the
Probit model in recession forecasting, I find that its predictive performance is better than the
models using the long-short yield spread in the near- and median-term forecasts by various
measures, especially after the early 1980s. Without fully exploring the full information of
the term structure, the conventional approach based on the long-short yield spread can miss
many positive signals and downplay the predictive power the entire yield curve.
The remaining paper proceeds as follows: Section two describes the data and the classi-
fication algorithm. Section three examines the evolutionary patterns of the Treasury yields
and shapes. Section four explores the links between the shape and recessions. Section five
applies the yield curve shape in forecasting recessions and evaluates its performance. Section
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six concludes. Non-essential details and evidence are collected in the Appendix.
2 Data and Methodology
This section introduces some basic concepts in understanding the yield curve, describes the
dataset on the U.S. Treasury yields, proposes an effective algorithm for classifying its shapes,
and reports the key statistics for the classification results.
2.1 Treasury yields
The most fundamental concept in yield curve study is the yield to maturity, henceforth YTM.
It measures annualized rate of return if the investor holds the bond to maturity. This interest
rate is implied from the market price of the corresponding bond. For simplicity, consider
a zero-coupon bond with face value FV and maturity T , its theortical price will satify the
discounted present value formula P = FV (1+Y )−T , where Y is the zero-coupon bond YTM.
Relating bond yield (Y TM) to its maturity T constitutes the term structure analysis (or
yield curve analysis).1 However, the U.S. Department of the Treasury does not create or
publish any zero-coupon rates. Instead, Treasury yield curve is based on securities that pay
coupon interest on a semiannual basis, the yields are considered "bond-equivalent" yields
and the yield curve is considered a par yield curve, which corresponds to securities traded
close to or at its face value.2 The U.S. Treasury market yields are calculated from composite
of quotations obtained by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and current Treasury
daily yield curve is fitted by a quasi-cubic hermite spline function.3 The methodology and
techniques to construct more consistent market yield curves have been improving significantly
over the past decades. A more technical approach to fitting the U.S. Treasury yield curve
can be found in Gürkaynak, et. al. (2007).
As described in Table 1, the Federal Reserve Board data download program provides
the most comprehensive yield data on U.S. Treasury securities in H.15 statistics since 1953.
1Bond yields (inversely related to the price) are influenced by many other risk factors such as credit
default, liquidity, call option, tax treatment, and coupon payment schemes. In practice, it is never possible
to hold all other factors constant and isolate the relationship between yields and their maturities. Therefore,
a pure term structure of interest rates never exists and is unobservable. For instance, bonds within the same
credit rating trade with various degrees of liquidity. More often, due to the differences in coupon payment,
securities with the same maturity can carry different yields (the higher the coupon rate, the higher the price,
all else equal), let alone different maturities. Thus, while economists can model the pure term structure
through zero coupon bonds in theory, practitioners need to ”bootstrap” the discount factors successively
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At the short end, Treasury bills are money market assets with maturities of 1 year or less,
sold at a discount from par and do not bear periodic interest payments. Treasury notes are
median term coupon securities with maturities from 2 to 10 years. Treasury bonds have
maturities more than 10 years. Treasury notes and bonds are capital market assets carrying
periodic coupon payments. Yields derived from all these securities are therefore regarded as
short term rates, median term rates and long term rates, respectively. In the H.15 statistics,
only the 1-year, 3-year, 5-year, and 10-year yields are fully available over the entire sample
from April, 1953 to present.
Table 1: Federal Reseve Board H.15––Treasury yields
Maturity Instruments Availability Obs
1-month Treasury bills 200107 : present 234
3-month Treasury bills 198201 : present 468
6-month Treasury bills 198201 : present 468
1-year Treasury bills 195304 : present 813
2-year Treasury notes 197606 : present 535
3-year Treasury notes 195304 : present 813
5-year Treasury notes 195304 : present 813
7-year Treasury notes 196907 : present 618
10-year Treasury notes 195304 : present 813
20-year Treasury bonds 195304 : 198612 732
199310 : present
30-year Treasury bonds 197702 : 200202 480
200602 : present
Note: Observations as of December, 2020.
Another source little explored in the literature is the NBER Macrohistory database,
which records monthly Treasury yields further back to 1920. Rather than reporting the
yield per instrument, this dataset contains yield series averaging over close maturies. And
the obsevations in this dataset are more unevenly distributed over various sample periods. It
should also be noted that other inconsistency exist in its data collection and revision process.
For these reasons, this paper only utilizes the NBER dataset from January, 1945 to March,
1953 to graph the yield movements.
2.2 Shape classification
Despite its popularity, yield curve classification remains at a heuristic level and few has ap-
plied any rigorous metric, not to mention effective computer algorithms. News and media
aside, academic research and economic textbooks provide some examples. Malkiel (1966)
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constructs the ascending, flat, descending, and humped yield curves. Campell (1995) de-
scribes yield curve shape as upward-sloping, downward-sloping (inverted), hump shaped,
or even trough shaped (inverted hump shaped). Mishkin’s textbook (2018) classifies yield
curves as upward-sloping, fat, and downward-sloping. In Fabozzi et al. (2019), historical
shapes observed for the Treasury yield curve are defined as postively sloped (upward-sloping),
inverted (downward-sloping), and flat.4
Figure 1: U.S. Treasury yield curve: observed shapes
Figure 1 displays five typical shapes of the U.S. Treasury yield curve on different dates.
Analagous to literature mentioned above, I denote them upward (U), downward (D), flat
(F), hump (H), and bowl (B). Here, the B-shape is equivalent to the inverted hump-shape.
Noticeably, yield curves differ by their level, slope, and curvature.5 Therefore, our yield
curve classification can first condense all cross-sectional yields into these three measures
from which then derived the shape. Given the Treasury yield data, I provide a summary
of the corresponding measures and calculations in Table 2. The 10-year yield is calculated
into the average long yield here whereas it is in practice considered as a Treasury note rate.
There are two reasons for this adjustment. First, the 10-year Treasury yield has been chosen
in the literature most frequently as the long end when computing the slope of the yield curve.
4The authors further distinguish between a normal and a steep yield curve by applying a threshold of
300 basis points to the yield spread between the 30-year bond and the six-month bill.
5In statistical modeling, the level, slope and curvature refer to the first three principle components, or
the common factors, of bond yields (Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991). Jointly, they can explain over 95%
of the variation in yields. Notice, however, they are unobversable factors, not the shape per se.
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Second, the data on 10-year yield have been available throughout the entire sample and it
can balances the calculations of the yield levels by contributing to the average long yield.
Table 2: U.S. Treasury yield curve: measures and calculations
Measure Definition Calculation
Ys The average of short-term yields (Y1m + Y3m + Y6m + Y1y)/4
Level Ym The average of median-term yields (Y2y + Y3y + Y5y + Y7y)/4
Yl The average of long-term yields (Y10y + Y20y + Y30y)/3
Sms The difference between Ym and Ys Ym − Ys
Spread Slm The difference between Yl and Ym Yl − Ym
Sls The difference between Yl and Ys Yl − Ys
Curvature Curv The difference between 2Ym and Ys + Yl 2Ym − (Ys + Yl)
A classification algorithm is a formal metric of observations. Based on the measures,
an effective classification algorithm follows three principles: First, the shape being classified
must be visually recognizable and exactly identified. Second, the classified shape provides a
sufficient summary of the full information on cross-sectional yields. Third, the time series of
classfied shapes must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive for any given sample.
Table 3: Shape classification algorithm for the Treasury yield curve
Yield curve shapes Term structure relations with 0.1 percent threshold Sample
Upward (U) (Ym − Ys > 0.1 & Ym 5 Yl) or (Ys 5 Ym & Yl − Ym > 0.1) 2010-04
Hump (H) (Ym − Ys > 0.1 & Ym > Yl) or (Ys < Ym & Ym − Yl > 0.1) 1982-07
Flat (F) |Ym − Ys| 5 0.1 and |Yl − Ym| 5 0.1 2006-02
Bowl (B) (Ys − Ym > 0.1 & Ym < Yl) or (Ys > Ym & Yl − Ym > 0.1) 2000-12
Downward (D) (Ys − Ym > 0.1 & Ym = Yl) or (Ys = Ym & Ym − Yl > 0.1) 1980-03
Note: Ys, Ym, Yl represent average short, median, and long yields. Source: Chen (2019).
Summarized in Table 3, the algorithm reduces data dimension from eleven U.S. Treasury
yields to three average yields: Ys, Ym, Yl, which are the simple average of T-bill, note,
and bond yields. Accounting for missing observations, they only average over available
data points in respective maturity sector. Based on the spread and curvature relations, the
algorithm defines five shapes. To separate the B-shape and D-shape, it sets the flat yield
curve as a benchmark with a threshold of ten basis points for the differences among averaged
yields. The H-shape yield curve is high in the middle but low on both ends; the B-shape
yield curve is the opposite––low in the middle but high on both ends. While the F-, U-, and
5
Review of Economic Analyais forthcoming (14) 2022
www.RofEA.org
D-shape yield curves allow weak inequality relations among yields, the yield relations of the
H- and B-shape are strictly unequal. The algorithm is effective in producing a sequence of
yield curve shapes, applicable to any data frequency (Chen, 2019). A complete visualization
of all classified U.S. Treasury yield curves and sensitivity analysis are in the Appendix.6
The key statistics of classified monthly yield curve are shown in Table 4. In addition to
their counts and frequency, reported are the mean and standard deviation of the average
yields and their corresponding spreads, conditional on each type of the yield curve.
Table 4: U.S. Treasury yield curve: shape classification statistics (1953.04-2020.12)
Shapes Counts Ys Ym Yl Sls Sms Slm Curv
Full sample 813 (100%) 4.62 5.28 5.85 1.22 0.65 0.57 0.09
(3.29) (3.12) (2.80) (1.31) (0.71) (0.72) (0.57)
Upward (U) 598 (73.6%) 3.75 4.69 5.52 1.77 0.94 0.83 0.11
(2.78) (2.88) (2.65) (1.03) (0.55) (0.64) (0.59)
Hump (H) 78 (9.6%) 6.60 6.89 6.69 0.09 0.29 -0.20 0.49
(3.06) (3.17) (3.13) (0.32) (0.28) (0.13) (0.30)
Down (D) 70 (8.6%) 9.29 8.72 8.30 -0.99 -0.57 -0.42 -0.15
(3.57) (3.22) (3.04) (0.65) (0.47) (0.29) (0.44)
Bowl (B) 41 (5.0%) 5.14 4.85 5.09 -0.06 -0.30 0.24 -0.54
(2.03) (1.96) (1.88) (0.34) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21)
Flat (F) 26 (3.2%) 5.43 5.45 5.46 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
(1.75) (1.71) (1.73) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Notes: Ys, Ym, Yl are the average yields of Treasury bill, note, and bond yields in percentage,
respectively. Based on the classification algorithm, reported values are the sample means with
standard deviations in the parentheses. Source: The original monthly yields data are downloaded
from the Federal Reserve Board H.15 Treasury nominal yield statistics.
For the full sample, the U.S. Treasury yield curve slopes up with a long-short spread of
123 basis points. It is concave but not statistically significant. The short yields are more
volatile than the long yields and the yield spreads are much less volatile than the levels.
In a descending order of frequency, we observe the upward-sloping yield curve (U 76.2%),
the humped (H 8.64%), the downward-sloping (D 7.75%), the bowl (B 4.54%), and the flat
(F 2.88%). These frequencies represent the unconditional distribution of the shape in the
sample period. Since the upward-sloping is the dominant shape in the sample, whereas
others together account for less than 30%, this paper groups the four less frequent shapes
into one category, the minor shapes, and use this terminology hereafter. Interestingly, the
Treasury yield curve not only distinguishes themselves by their shapes but also levels.7
6Admittedly, a truly flat yield curve can never exist in the data. A smaller threshold classifies less F-shape
but a larger one renders the classification less precise as it groups more U-, B- and H-shape into the F-shape.
The choice of 10% threhold strikes a balance between separation (B and H) and over-classification (F).
7In principle, the yield curve can display any shape independent of its level. In reality, however, the shape
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3 Business Cycle Panoramas
To investigate the yield movement and shape evolution over different stages of the U.S.
business cycle, I examine their recurring patterns and provide statistical evidence for their
underlying linkages.
3.1 Comovement and inversion
Figure 2 displays the yield movements over the past century, with shaded areas indicating
the U.S. recessions.8 Over the whole sample, all yields march ups and downs in a remarkably
synchrous manner. From 1945 to present, the large swing in yields implies the mean-reverting
nature of interest rates in the long cycle.9
Figure 2: U.S. Treasury yields: comovements (1945.01-2020.12)
is not independent of its levels, as shown in the classification results.
8According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)’s business cycle dating committe,
the U.S. economy is either in expansion or contraction, measured by the level of real economic activities.
Between any two successive recessions, the economy is in expansion. Contractions (recessions) start at the
peak of a business cycle and end at the trough. Refer to the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Procedure for
more details. https://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html
9Historically, the U.S. interest rate had hit the zero bound twice in the aftermath of the two most severe
economic recessions, with the Treasury 3-month bill rate 0.01% in October of 1932 and the Treasury 1-month
bill rate 0.00% in December of 2008. History repeats in 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
short-term Treasury 1-, 2,-, 3-month rates dropped to zero on March 25, 2020. Along their paths, the long
yields also fell to historical lows in each of this senarios. At the other extreme, the peak of interest rate
was recorded in the second half of 1981 when the economy was wrestling with runaway inflation (e.g., the
Federal funds rate 22.36% on July 22 and the Treasury 1-year bill rate 17.31% on September 3).
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Normally, the long-term yields are higher than the short-term yields. Hence, we observe
the upward-sloping yield curve most often. Occasionally, the short yields can overtake the
long yields, presenting a downward-sloping yield curve (e.g., in 2000). Very rare but not
unlikely, all yields can cross and generate a flat yield curve (e.g., in 2006). Barely visible in
the graph, the median yield can shoot above or below both ends of the yield curve, forming
the hump-shape (e.g., in 2000) and bowl-shape yield curves (e.g., in 2019).
Over the business cycles, yield levels tend to rise in expansions and fall in recessions.
Although their turning points are not in line with the NBER reference dates, the local
interest rate maxima are more likely to precede the business cycle peaks while the local
interest rate minima tend to follow business cycle roughs. Furthermore, the short yield tend
to rise slightly above the long yield around the business cycle peaks, rendering the downward-
sloping yield curve. Around and months after the business cycle troughs, the short yield tend
to fall much below the long yield, featuring the steeply upward-sloping yield curve.
To better capture and visualize the less common patterns, the time series of three yield
spreads and the curvature are shown in the Figure 3. Yield inversion can be defined as the
process in which the slope of the yield curve switches from positive to negative. A narrowing
of the yield spreads vividly charaterizes the transition. In terms of shape change, it begins
with an upward-sloping yield curve, then flattens out, and finally inverts to downward-
sloping. And vice versa. Prior to the business cycle peaks, yield spreads tend to hit their
local bottoms and then bounce back. Around and shortly after the business cycle troughs,
yield spreads tend to reach their local maxima. The turning points of the spread are not
symmetric in size: on average, the slope of the upward yield curve is much bigger than the
slope of the downward yield curve in absolute value.
Compared with the levels and spreads, the yield curve curvature seems to drift like a
white noise with little dectable link to the business cycle. Indeed, the sample correlations
between the curvature and the levels are the weakest (below 0.2) among all. Although the
correlations between the yields (and spreads) over the entire sample are strong and positive,
their signs can turn negative or become insignificant in relatively short time frames. While
the short yields are the dominant forces driving most of the negative yield curve inversions,
the long yields tend to rise during the inversions as well (see the Apprendix for details).
3.2 Yield and shape evolution
To explore their linkages, I divide the U.S. business cycle into four stages and provide sum-
mary statistics for the corresponding yields and shapes. Since the shape data can only be
created when three average yields are commonly available, our analysis starts from January,
8
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Figure 3: U.S. Treasury yields: inversions (1945.01-2020.12)
1945 to March, 2020. The four business cycle stages are grouped into the 12-month periods
before recessions, in-recession periods, 12-month periods after recessions, and otherwise. For
two consecutive recessions not further apart, the period in between is considered as a pre-
recession period. It applies once only to the 12 months between the 1980 recession and the
1981 recession in this study.10
Conditional on different stages of the business cycle, I summarize the first two moments of
the yield levels, spreads, and curvature in Table 6. On average, yields hit their plateau during
the 12-month periods before recession, remain at a relatively high level during the recessions,
and enter the trough in the post-recession 12-month periods. Yield spreads turn negative
prior to recessions, bounced back to positive in recessions, and widen in the post-recession
12-month periods. Also note that yield spreads are on average smallest before recession,
corresponding to downward-sloping yield curves; they are largest during the post-recession
recovery periods, equivalent to steeply upward-sloping yield curves.
Similarly, yield curvature becomes negative prior to recessions, return to positive in
recessions, and shows a sizable increase when entering economic expansions. The yield curve
tends to increase its concavity (hump) as the business cycle moves from pre-recession to
post-recession. This is illustrated by the empirical mean curvature which increases from
-0.12 in stage I to 0.4 in stage III.
Compared with the recession-related three stages, yield levels are less volatile during
10The 12-month interval is chosen arbitrarily for the convenience of framing the event window for shape
variation. Similar patterns are observed when a 18-month interval is selected.
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Table 5: Treasury yield statistics over the U.S. business cycle (1953.04–2020.12)
Stage I: all pre-recession 12-month periods (124 months)
Stage II: all in-recession periods (121 months)
Stage III: all post-recession 12-month periods (108 months)
Stage IV: all otherwise periods (460 months)
Yield measures I II III IV All
Ys 6.59 (3.51) 5.37 (4.43) 3.89 (2.75) 4.07 (2.69) 4.62 (3.29)
Level Ym 6.41 (3.23) 5.91 (4.23) 5.07 (2.77) 4.86 (2.71) 5.28 (3.12)
Yl 6.34 (2.98) 6.38 (3.77) 5.86 (2.60) 5.57 (2.44) 5.85 (2.80)
Sls -0.25 (0.74) 1.00 (1.27) 1.96 (1.10) 1.50 (1.18) 1.22 (1.31)
Spread Sms -0.18 (0.48) 0.53 (0.70) 1.18 (0.50) 0.79 (0.61) 0.65 (0.71)
Slm -0.07 (0.39) 0.47 (0.72) 0.78 (0.67) 0.71 (0.70) 0.57 (0.72)
Curvature Curv -0.12 (0.46) 0.07 (0.63) 0.40 (0.46) 0.08 (0.58) 0.09 (0.57)
Note: Reported statistics are the sample mean with the standard deviation in parenthesis.
Ys average short yield, Ym average median yield, Yl average long yield, Sls long-short
spread, Sms median-short spread, Slm long-median spread, Curv curvature. Sources:
Federal Reserve Board H.15 Treasury nominal yield statistics.
the non-recession periods, as measured by the standard deviation. In particular, volatility
of all yields increases preceding recessions, becomes most volatile in recession periods, and
then dwindles after recessions. Similar volatility patterns are observed for the spreads and
curvature.11
Table 6 provides a summary for the conditional shape counts and frequency over the
stages of business cycles. In the last column of the table, the full-sample statistics serve as
our comparision benchmark. The bottom row calculates the relative frequency of each stage
over the business cycle. In the past 68 years, the U.S. economy was in recessions for about
10 years, or 14.9% of the time. Compared to the benchmark, the relative frequency of the
four minor shapes more than doubled (F and H) and some even quadrupled (B and D) in
the pre-recession stage. Accordingly, the upward-sloping yield curve shrank in frequency by
more than 50%. Among the four minor shapes, the D-shape occurred relatively more often
in the pre-recession stage than others. In recessions, the B-, D- and H-shape were observed
slightly more active than their full sample counterparts. In the post-recession stage, the
upward-sloping yield curve almost took over, leaving only three appearances of the H-shape.
Lastly, despite their remarkable densities in the pre-recession stage, the four minor shapes
11In the Appendix, a visual comparison of the yield volatility over the different stages of business cycle is
displayed in bar plots. Both standard deviation and median absolute deviation measures are applied, which
establishes the robustness of the result. In addition, real-time volatility of the yields is estimated over the
entire sample and some largest jumps in yields are ordered.
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Table 6: Treasury yield curve shape over the U.S. business cycle (1953.04–2020.12)
Stage I: all pre-recession 12-month periods (124 months)
Stage II: all in-recession periods (121 months)
Stage III: all post-recession 12-month periods (108 months)
Stage IV: all otherwise periods (460 months)
I II III IV All
Upward (U) 24 (19.4%) 81 (66.9%) 105 (97.2%) 388 (84.3%) 598 (73.6%)
Hump (H) 24 (19.4%) 20 (16.5%) 3 (2.78%) 31 (6.74%) 78 (9.6%)
Down (D) 41 (33.1%) 13 (10.7%) 0 (0.00%) 16 (3.48%) 70 (8.6%)
Bowl (B) 25 (20.2%) 7 (5.78%) 0 (0.00%) 9 (1.96%) 41 (5.0%)
Flat (F) 10 (8.06%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 16 (3.48%) 26 (3.2%)
All shapes 124 (15.3%) 121 (14.9%) 108 (13.3%) 460 (56.6%) 813 (100%)
Note: Reported statistics are the sample mean with the standard deviation in parenthesis. Data
sources: Federal Reserve Board H.15 Treasury nominal yield statistics.
were rarely present in the stage distant from the recessions.
By nature, yield and shape are two perspectives of the same term structure. While
multiple yield values provide direct measures, the categorical shape condenses the entire
yield curve into a single letter. The advantage of shape measure is obvious: it tracks its
evolution over time in the most concise manner. Figure 4 displays the full picture since
1953.12 The most frequent shape is plotted in the bottom and the least on top. Evidently,
the four minor shapes tend to cluster before the recessions. More surprisingly, all minor
shapes only show up before the recessions since late 1980s. Most alarming, the shape signals
have become gradually more uniform to detect, as manifested by the pure B-shape in 2019,
prior to the 2020 recession. A puzzle hence emerges: what theory can account for the
time-varying ocurrences of these seemingly recession-related shape signals?
Despite these stunning patterns, no shape signal has been detected in the 1945, 1949, and
1954 recessions. In hindsight, the signals around 1966 could be wrong in foretelling a recession
whereas actually it never arrived. Noises aside, whether such recession forecastability exists
and to what extent will be investigated in detail. A word of caution: neither can any shape
cause a recession nor an expansion; they are merely parts of the business cycle fluctuations.
12To differentiate the same shape observed mutiple times in the same year, resampling methods are used in
plotting the shapes for each year. Therefore, the dots clustered in any given year do not necessarily indicate
their occurence over time.
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Figure 4: U.S. Treasury yield curve: shape evolution (1953.04-2020.12)
4 Shapes and Recessions
Can the shape of the yield curve predict recession? This section investigates the predictability
ex-post along a number of dimensions and provides descriptive answers.
4.1 Timing, duration, and strength
Aforementioned, the four minor shapes tend to occur more often in the pre-recession stage
than other periods. If we focus on a time frame spanning the recessions, the event study
approach is well suited to catch their exact timing and duration.13 To study the recession
predictability of the yield curve shape, however, no cause and effect is present in its nature.
The beginning month of each recession is defined as the starting point of this event study.
For the past ten successive recessions before which the shape of yield curve moves abnomally
(relative to the normal shape), a window width of 18 months is chosen to cover the event in
both directions.14 Figure 5 summarizes the results with each colored dot representing one
shape at a time. The vertical dahsed line marks the beginning of a recession. On the whole,
13In finance, an event study is a statistical method to assess the impact of an event on the value of a firm.
Refer to World Bank DIME Wiki (https://dimewiki.worldbank.org/wiki/Event_Study).
14The choice of 18 months suffices to cover more than 95% of the minor shapes. A 24-month window
analysis is shown in the Appendix.
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the shape "effects" to its left dramatically differ from those to the right, allowing for the
overlapping 12-month when the 1980 post-recession met the 1981 pre-recession periods.
Figure 5: Treasury yield curve shape timing over recessions
The timing of the shape is interesting but perplexing. The minor shapes were spotted as
early as 18 months before the recessions, some even earlier. While the H-, D-, and F-shapes
were the major forerunners in the earlier recessions, the B-shape played a more central role
in the recent three recessions. In terms of effects, never had any other shape signaled more
intensely than the downward-sloping yield curve in the early 1980s recessions. Historically,
although rampant inflation was responsible for the formation of D-shape, the underlying
economic factors casting the H- and B-shape yield curves were little examined.
Another complexity in understanding the shape timing is the "noises" in the midst of
recessions. Specifically, in the midst of the 1970 and 1974 recessions, were the H-, B-, and D-
shapes signaling more economic downturns or displaying their remanent effects from earlier
on? If they were trying to foretell an upcoming recession, why was it not coming in other
cases? If they were just the remanent effects, why were there no such pattern in the recent
recessions?
When it comes to their duration, each minor shape tend to cluster in batches. For the ten
past recessions since 1957, Figure 6 plots shape counts within the 18-month window before
each recession such that the relative importance of each shape is measured by its length in
each bar. The horizontal dashed line sets a 50% benchmark for comparison. In stark contrast
to its full-sample frequency, the upward-sloping yield curve declined to less than 50% in the
18-month event window prior to each recession. In the 1970 and 1980 pre-recession periods,
13
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the upward-sloping yield curve completely disappeared. Conversely, the four minor shapes
took over and became unusually active in this 18-month window with duration much longer
and frequencies much higher than other stages in the business cycle. Judging by the duration
alone, however, not a single shape can dominate others over the entire sample in foretelling
recessions, because the duration of each shape varied over time. Even the most dazzling
D-shape observed in 1970s and 1980s was completely shadowed by the emerging B-shape in
recent decades. As a result of the time-varying feature, it is not obvious to rank and access
the relative performance of each minor shape in forecasting recessions.
Figure 6: Treasury yield curve shape duration before recessions
Since the less frequent shapes become more active in the event window of the recessions,
are more severe recessions associated with more intense signals of the shape? To answer this
question, it is necessary to classify recessions by some degree of severity and measure the
strength of the shape signals.
For the past ten recessions preceded by the less frequent shapes since 1957, their length
varied and most of the minor shapes were concentrated in the pre-recesssion stage. With
all available data, I classify the ten recessions into four tranches in terms of their respective
length: the mild recessions of the 1980 (less than two quarters), the moderate of the 1957-
1958, 1990-1991, 2001-2001 (more than two quarters but less than three quarters), the serious
of 1960-1961, 1970-1970, and 2020 (more than three quarters but less than one year), and
the 1973-1975, 1981-1982, 2008-2009 severe recessions (longer than a year). Overall, this
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grouping balances the number of recessions in each tranch.15
Figure 7: Shape signal strength and recession duration (1953-2020)
In similar fashion, the strength of shape signals can be measured by their respective
counts within the recession-related windows. However, two adjustments are made to filter
out "noises" and amplify signals. Notice that the 1980 post-recession overlapped the 1981
pre-recession for 12 months; the minor shape signals were consistently strong in between. It
is more convincing to consider these occurences as signaling the 1981-1982 severe recession
rather than some remaining effects from the 1980 mild recession. Another adjustment is due
to the unusually long lasting signals observed before the 1970 serious recession: a continuum
of 30 months of minor shapes were persistently present since July, 1967. Even though the
18-month event window was chosen to "receive" signals before recessions, it is not convincing
to consider the extra 12 months as "noises" and discard them in this particular case. Thus,
I relate them to the 1970 recession.
Matching the shape strength to recession duration, Figure 7 displays their association.
Those colored dots in the left graph represent the minor shapes and their clustered density
mounts in conjunction with the duration of recession. In the right graph, the height of each
bar is the total counts of the minor shapes and it rises as a recesion lasts longer.
15Based on the NBER business cycle chronology from 1957 to present, the shortest recession endures for
six month (1980), the longest 18 months (2008-2009), three for eight months (1957-1958, 1990-1991, 2001-
2001), two for 16 months (1973-1975, 1981-1982), one for ten months (1960-1961), and one for eleven months
(1970-1970). As of December, 2020, the U.S. economy has been in recession for ten months since March.
https://www.nber.org/cycles.html
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4.2 The wrong and missing signals
Undoubtedly, a strong link exists between the shape and recession. Nonetheless, exceptions
can be found. The most obvious outliers are a series of strikingly persistent minor shape
signals from the end of 1964 to the beginning of 1967. Specifically, from December, 1964 to
February, 1967, a total of 22 minor shapes were present in 27 months. Were they related to
any recession in the interval? Was the wolf coming or just a false alarm?16
According to the data from the World Bank, the U.S. economy was geared down to a much
slower growth rate of 2.5% in 1967 from 6.5% in the previous year, then it bounced back to
4.8% in 1968.17 It turns out that, for the post-WWII U.S. economy, an annual decline of 4%
real GDP growth rate is the sharpest in record without triggering a recession, whereas the
NBER business cycle dating committee only considers more than two consecutive quarters of
negative growth rate in real economic activities as a recession. Other than that, no obvious
"mistake" was detected in the sample when evaluating the false postive signals.18 Hence,
the seemingly wrong signals were indeed a reliable indicator of future economic downturns.
On the false negative side, the obvious exceptions appear in three consecutive recessions
after 1945. Why was there no signal before the wolf was coming? A short answer is the U.S.
fiscal and monetary policy in facilitating low-cost wartime finance. According to the 2016
FOMC document “Targeting the yield curve: The experience of the Federal Reserve, 1942-
51," during the nine-year period from early 1942 until the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord
of 1951, the yield on long-term Treasury bonds was capped at 2.5 percent, and ceilings were
also imposed at several other points. In addition, the yield on short-term Treasury bills was
pegged at 3/8 percent up until July 1947. The yield curve control policy exerted long-lasting
influence on the market yields: It was until after 1950, the short and long term yields rose
gradually and the yield spreads started to narrow. And later the first post-WWII yield curve
inversion arrived in 1957.
When the short and long yields were targeted at their respective values, the shape of
yield curve was fixed on both ends. As long as the median yields were in line with the policy
committment, an upward-sloping yield curve was the result. Therefore, shape signals were
muted before recessions under the policy of interest rate controls. In the post-WWII data,
provided that the Fed did not peg the interest rates, the Treasury bond market has been
16From July, 1967 to October, 1970, a continuum of 40 months of minor shapes were present. The 1970
recession started from January to November. Compared with the other recessions, the signals prior to the
1970 recession were unusually long and remained strong toward the end of the recession. Despite the "noises,"
this batch is believed to contain true signals which forecast the 1970 incoming recession.
17https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/gdp-growth-rate
18That said, a single isolated H-shape was spotted in September, 1984, but was 21 months away from the
1981-1982 severe recession. Should it be a false signal, but don’t be too hard on the hero.
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reliably signaling recessions or downturns. This is critical in understanding the prediction
of yield curve as recession signals. I now proceed to quantitative models and estimation in
evaluation of the predictive power of the yield curve.
5 Recession Predictability
Every now and then, it is alarmingly reported in the news and media that a flatting or
inverted yield curve precedes most recessions. Since the late 1980s, academic literature
have begun investigating the power of the yield curve as a recession predictor in the post-
WWII data. Estrella et al. (2003) find that term spread models predicting recessions are
stable over time. Wheelock and Wohar (2009) provide a comprehensive literature survey.
It is further shown that the yield spread model dominates the professional forecastors in
real-time recession forecast (Rudebusch and Williams, 2009; Croushore and Marsten, 2016).
However, existing research relies exclusively on a particular slope, or term spread, of the
yield curve. Other parts of information in the yield curve had been largely ignored. Since
the shape indicator distills all essential information of the entire yield curve, would it be
more useful in predicting recessions than the spreads?
5.1 Spreads vs shapes
The starting point of applying the yield curve slope or yield spread to recession forecast can
be featured by tracking the size of the yield curve inversion over the business cycle. Shown
in Figure 3, preceding the past ten recessions, the three yield spreads almost all narrowed
down and became negative. On the whole, the long-short spread exhibited the most sizeable
inversions among the three. Does it send more powerful signals than others? Moreover,
does more negative values of the spreads deliver more reliable forecasts? To answer these
questions, we need to compare their changing patterns across recessions and then develop
formal statistical tests.
Following the eariler event study approach, I focus on the 18-month window aysmmetric
around the starting month of recessions and compare the patterns of the yield spreads across
the board. Furthermore, I mimic the regression discontinuity design (RDD) and fit the
data with a linear equation on both side of the threshold in order to detect whether the
spreads drop significantly below zero prior to the recessions. No data adjustment is made
for overlapping recession stages. The results are in Figure 8 with 95% confidence bands for
the estimated equations. Several observations sharpen our cross-sectional comparison: 1) all
yield spreads and curvature share a common trend—sliding down before recessions and rising
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up in and after recessions; 2) the long-short and median-short spreads show a statistically
significant dip below zero when closing in to the border; 3) the long-short and median-short
spreads show a statistically significant regression discontinuity across the threshold; 4) the
long-median spread and the curvature do not exhibit significantly different patterns across
the border, which indicates a lack of variation and strength in forecasting recessions.
Figure 8: Change of yield spreads and curvature across recessions
To estimate and forecast recession probabilities, a statistical model is required. For a
binary recession variable, the most widely adopted model in the forecasting literature is the
Probit model.19 Based on the Probit statistical model, macroeconmists apply the slope of
yield curve, or the yield spread, to predict recessions and many other economic activities.
While it is straightforward to measure the yield curve slope as the difference between
a long-term yield and a short-term yield, the question is which yield shall be chosen? In
the literature, the choice of the long and short yields depends on data availability and
measurement consistency (Estrella and Trubin, 2006). For instance, Estrella and Hardouvelis
(1991) chose the 10-year Treasury bond rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate. Benzoni and
Chyruk (2018) employed the 10- minus 2-year Treasury spread. Another popular choice is
19Another binary response model in application is the Logit model with which Stock and Watson (1989),
for example, have also documented preditive power of the yield curve slope. Both the Probit and Logit
models generate similar estimation results. Furthermore, based on a stability test, Estrella et al. (2003)
identified that the spread model that predicts recession is stable over time in the United States and Germany.
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the 10-year Treasury yield less the Federal funds rate. However, were it not for convenience,
there is no reason to omit other maturity sectors of the yield curve. To fully explore the
information content of the entire yield curve, the three average yield spreads and the shapes
will all be used in forecasting recessions.
Unlike the numerical spread measures, the classified yield curve shape is a categorical
variable and takes five discrete values. To distinguish their information content and generate
meaningful forecast in regressions, separate binary variables are defined for distinct shapes
as inputs in the Probit model, where each shape only takes zero or one.20
P (Recessiont+h|Spreadt) = P (Z ≤ α + β ∗ Spreadt) = Φ(α + β ∗ Spreadt) (5.1)
P (Recessiont+h|Shapet) = P (Z ≤ γBBt + γDDt + γFFt + γHHt + γUUt) (5.2)








The simple Probit model is our starting point and well-suited to compare the recession
predictive content of the yield spreads and the shapes. Covering the full sample of April
1953 to December 2020, our first exercise provides coefficient estimates and model fits in
forecasting recession one year ahead.
In Table 7, almost all coefficient estimates are statistically significant except for three of
the minor shapes.21 Based on the pesudo-R2 measures, the models using the median-short
spread and the shapes have the best fit, whereas the curvature shows little predictive power
relative to a constant intercept model. Among the spreads, the sub-sample analysis shows
that the long-short spread produces finer fitted model in the first half sample (1953-1986)
and the median-short spread in the second (1987-2020) as well as the overall sample.
Figure 9 visualizes the estimation and comparision results. Both the spread and shapes
display maxmium forecast power of recessions around four quarters ahead, whereas their
forecasted recession probabilities are much lower in the most immediate and distant future.
By construction, a decline in yield spread is associated with rising probability in future
recessions. In contrast, the shapes do not generate a continuous range of recession probability
forecasts as the spread does. Nonetheless, the four minor shapes on average produce recession
20The advantage of setting up the model in this manner comes from the mutually exclusive content of
each regressor in the time series data. Therefore, the estimation results based on this model would reflect
the average predictive strength of a particular shape over the entire estimation sample, independent of other
shapes. Note that no intercept shall be included to avoid regression multicollinearity.
21Owing to the binary nature of the variables as well as their less frequent occurence, the estimates of the
coefficients of the shape model exhibit much higher variation than the spread model.
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forecasts at least twice as much as their benchmark upward-sloping shape whose forecasts
are uniformly smaller than the unconditional recession probability 14.9% in the sample.
Figure 9: Recession probability forecasts: yield curve spread vs shapes (1953.04-2020.12)
Figure 10: Full-sample one-year-ahead recession probability forecasts (1953.04-2020.12)
Figure 10 recovers the one-year-ahead full-sample estimates of recession probabitiles.
Out of eleven recessions, the median-short spread dominates the long-short and the median-
short spreads in approaching true recession probabilities; the shape predictor outperforms
the median-short spread in most recessions except the ones in the mid-70s and early-80s.
Despite the binary nature of the shapes, the step-wise recession probabilities they generate
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in this exercise is on average more accurate than any other spreads in predicting recessions
a year ahead.
Though counter-intutitive and unexpected, these findings imply that the size of the neg-
ative spread alone might not necessarily be a good predictor of the forthcoming recesssions;
different choices of the yield spread perhaps weights more. In particular, the discovery of
potentitally more powerful predictors than the long-short spread is encouraging. It is time
to evaluate their predicitive power in formal metrics.
5.2 Forecast evaluation
To measure the predictive performance of any model or predictor, the mean absolute error
(MAE) and the root mean square error (RMSE) are two most popular metrics, correspond-
ing to L1 and L2 loss functions, respectively. While theMAE is more robust to outliers, the
RMSE penalizes more heavily those predictions far away from actual values. A more spe-
cialized measure adopted in evaluating probabiliy forecast is the log probability score (LPS),
which coordinates the in-sample estimation criterion with the out-of-sample loss function for
the yield spread forecasts (Rubebusch and Williams, 2009).
For any forecasting horizon h and full sample size T , the calculation of prediction error
is shown in equations below, where P̂i is the forecasted recession probability at i+ h period
ahead based on the all observations (used in the estimation sample) up to T − h and Ii is


















[(1− Ii)ln(1− P̂i) + Iiln(P̂i)] (5.6)





|Ii − Îi|,where Îi =
1, if P̂i > cutoff0, otherwise (5.7)
In practice, recession prediction is also a classification problem. A threshold or cutoff
value, therefore, must be chosen to decide whether the probablistic forecasts of a recession
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can be considered as a positive event. As the most common metric used to quantify a binary
classifer, the classification error rate (CER) or misclassification rate is defined as percent of
false signals out of total predictions. Similary, if Ii is the recession indicator from the test
data and Îi is the binary classifer of a recession event from the ith forecast using the training
data in estimation, for any chosen cutoff value, Îi = 1 if P̂i >cutoff and Îi = 0 otherwise. A
simple choice of 50% for the threshold is common. Alternatively, a reasonable cutoff can be
calculated from the unconditional recession probability in the training sample
More recently, a good number of research applied receiver operating characteristics
(ROC) and area under the curve (AUC) method to assessing recession classification ac-
curacy (Berge and Jordà, 2011; Lahiri and Wang, 2013; Liu and Moench, 2016). This
approach first computes two types of recession classification outcomes––false positive rate
(TPR) and true positive rate (TPR)––for a full range of threshold, traces out the ROC
curve by plotting TPR against FPR, and then summarizes the forecast performance in a
single value by integrating over the ROC curve. As a comprehensive measure of probabilitic
forecast error, a rule of thumb in model selection is to favor the one with the highest AUC .
It is worth pointing out that these measures of forecast errors incorporate different phi-
losophy and standards in assessing the relative performance of competing models/predictors.
Hence, multiple comparisons and statistical tests are necessary to further our analysis.
5.2.1 In-sample analysis
In our full-sample evaluation, Table 8 compares the different measures of forecast errors
between the spread models and the shape model for horizons up to eight quarters ahead.
First, all forecast errors reach their minima around four or five quarters ahead. Second,
among the spreads, the median-short spread has the smallest errors in the four-quarters-
ahead recession forecasting by all measures. Last, the shapes fare slightly better than the
median-short spread except for the LPS and AUC measures.
When estimating the model for the subsample (1953-1986), the yield curve shapes out-
perform the spreads by three measures (MAE, RMSE, LPS) and the long-short spread
slightly dominates the median-short by all measures around four or five quarters ahead. For
the second subsample (1987-2020), the median-short spread is the champion by all mea-
sures and the shapes do slightly better than the long-short spread by MAE, RMSE, CER.
Diebold-Mariano tests (1995, 1997) for the equality of predictive accuracy show that the
relative forecast performance of the shapes, the long-median, and the long-short spreads are
not statistically significant, but they are all better than the long-median spread. To save
space, the results for D-M tests and sub-sample analysis are in the Appendix.
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Table 8: Full-sample evaluation of recession probability: forecast errors (1953.04-2020.12)
MAE RMSE
Spreadl−s Spreadm−s Spreadl−m Shapes Spreadl−s Spreadm−s Spreadl−m Shapes
1Q 0.239 0.236 0.245 0.237 0.345 0.343 0.349 0.344
2Q 0.218 0.211 0.233 0.215 0.327 0.325 0.338 0.328
3Q 0.196 0.186 0.219 0.188 0.310 0.305 0.327 0.307
4Q 0.187 0.178 0.210 0.175 0.305 0.302 0.321 0.296
5Q 0.189 0.182 0.209 0.185 0.309 0.306 0.322 0.304
6Q 0.199 0.199 0.210 0.203 0.321 0.319 0.327 0.319
7Q 0.212 0.215 0.217 0.224 0.331 0.331 0.334 0.335
8Q 0.223 0.227 0.225 0.236 0.337 0.338 0.339 0.343
CER (cutoff=50%) CER (cutoff=15%)
Spreadl−s Spreadm−s Spreadl−m Shapes Spreadl−s Spreadm−s Spreadl−m Shapes
1Q 0.148 0.147 0.149 0.149 0.42 0.37 0.49 0.24
2Q 0.143 0.144 0.147 0.147 0.33 0.29 0.41 0.21
3Q 0.139 0.131 0.138 0.133 0.27 0.24 0.36 0.20
4Q 0.135 0.131 0.137 0.129 0.24 0.22 0.33 0.18
5Q 0.133 0.133 0.139 0.128 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.20
6Q 0.140 0.143 0.147 0.135 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.22
7Q 0.139 0.141 0.145 0.140 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.26
8Q 0.141 0.139 0.144 0.141 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.29
LPS AUC
Spreadl−s Spreadm−s Spreadl−m Shapes Spreadl−s Spreadm−s Spreadl−m Shapes
1Q 0.392 0.387 0.405 0.390 0.679 0.698 0.635 0.661
2Q 0.357 0.345 0.383 0.360 0.773 0.792 0.710 0.721
3Q 0.319 0.303 0.359 0.317 0.839 0.864 0.763 0.795
4Q 0.303 0.290 0.344 0.292 0.866 0.887 0.791 0.831
5Q 0.303 0.296 0.339 0.308 0.857 0.868 0.797 0.803
6Q 0.318 0.324 0.337 0.340 0.829 0.819 0.798 0.744
7Q 0.342 0.353 0.347 0.377 0.783 0.761 0.775 0.655
8Q 0.364 0.375 0.363 0.396 0.722 0.691 0.727 0.588
Note: 1Q represents one-quarter ahead forecast, etc.. MAE–mean absolute error, RMSE–root mean square error, CER–
classification error rate, LPS–log probability score, AUC–area under the curve. The cutoff value is the threshold used to
classify probability forecasts of a recession as a positive event. The unconditional recession probability is 14.9% in the sample.
5.2.2 Out-of-sample analysis
In real-time forecasting, expanding- and rolling-window analyses are rountinely applied to
evaluate the out-of-sample performance among competing models. The procedure developed
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in this part shall carry more weight than the in-sample analysis.
The expanding window approach starts from a certain point in time and adds in one
addtional observation recursively in estimation and forecast. The choice of a starting point
must at least include enough historical data to produce estimation results. In practice, no
strict rule is imposed regarding the minimun portion of the sample in its first estimation. An
alternative out-of-sample forecasting evaluation employs the rolling window analysis. The
estimation begins with a fixed bandwidth and slides the window stepwise to the end of the
sample. While the expanding window method explores all information available in the sample
and weighs historical data more heavily regardless of their relevance to present situation, the
rolling window omits all historical data and tracks the most ongoing development closely.
A comparion between the two can also serve as a robustness check. To cover at least two
recessions in estimation, our analysis selects an initial window of 20 years (1953-1972).22
Figure 11 delivers the comparisons for forecasting horizons from one-month to 30-month
in the future. Overall, forecast errors fall inititally but rise quickly beyond the 16-month
horizon. Similar to the full-sample estimation results, all measures of forecast error indicate
an optimal forecasting horizon in between four and five quarters ahead. Though statistically
insignificant, the MAE slightly favors the long-short spread in the near- and median-term
horizons. Nonetheless, the RMSE, LPS, and AUC all select the median-short spread as
best predictor among all spreads. The yield curve shapes also beat the long-short spread in
terms of the RMSE and LPS, irrespective of window width. While the CER with a 15%
cutoff probability prefers the long-short spread, the one with 50% suggests the opposite. It
is worth noting that the long-short and long-median spreads excel in long-horizon forecast
(beyond 18 months). Other choices of window width further confirm most of these findings.
Figure 12 presents the results for the rolling window forecasts. The results are very
similar to those of the expanding window analysis. By most measures except for the MAE,
the median-short spread dominates the long-short spread for horizons up to 17 months,
irrespective of the width of estimation window. Measured by the MAE, the predictive
model based on the shapes improves a little and can even overtake all the spreads around
one-year ahead forecast, though the results are not robust when the window size increases.
Again, Diebold-Mariano tests (1995, 1997) for the equality of predictive accuracy show that
the relative forecast performance of the shapes, the long-median, and the long-short spreads
are not statistically significant, but they are all better than the long-median spread.
22Due to the annoucement procedure of the NBER business cycle dating committee, U.S. recessions have
always been identified at least three months later than its "book" value (what the public later know in hind-
sight). The forecasting procedure developed here is strictly speaking not based on the real-time information.
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Figure 11: Expanding window out-of-sample forecast errors (1953-2020)
Top left panel: MAE–mean absolute error. Top right panel: RMSE–root mean square error. Middle left
panel: CER cutoff=rec.prob–classification error rate for a probability threshold equal to 15%. Middle left
panel: CER cutoff=50%–classification error rate for a probability threshold equal to 50%.Bottom left panel:
LPS–log probability score. Bottom right panel: AUC-area under the curve. A window width of 20 years is
initialized in expanding window analysis. Other choices of window width are shown in the Appendix.
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Figure 12: Rolling window out-of-sample forecast errors (1953-2020)
Top left panel: MAE–mean absolute error. Top right panel: RMSE–root mean square error. Middle left
panel: CER (cutoff=rec.prob)–classification error rate for a probability threshold equal to 15%. Middle
left panel: CER (cutoff=50%)–classification error rate for a probability threshold equal to 50%.Bottom
left panel: LPS–log probability score. Bottom right panel: AUC-area under the curve. A fixed window
width of 20 years is initialized in rolling window estimation and forecast. Other choices of window width
are shown in the Appendix.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In the year preceding the 2020 recession, the B-shape yield curve became the harbinger again
and signaled nine times. In retrospect, it is intuitive, straightforward, and reliable to just
look at the shapes. This paper emphasizes the significant role of tracking the yield curve
shape in monitoring business cycles and predicting recessions.
Controlling for different choices of estimation procedure, window width, forecasting hori-
zons, and forecast errors, the median-short spread is, on the whole, a more powerful predictor
of recessions than the long-short spread, especially after the 1980s. Nevertheless, the per-
formance of the yield curve shape is also remarkable by various measures of forecast error,
though not statistically significant relative to the long-short spread. Even within a simple
Probit model, the analysis developed here hightlights the complexity and difficulty in real-
time recession forecast evaluation. To address structural breaks and serial correlation for
more robust results, more sophisticated model specification and estimation techniques, such
as in Chauvet and Potter (2005), remain for future research.
To conclude, the shape of the Treasury yield curve is a concise and valuable indicator in
studying the evolution of the term structure in general and predicting recessions in particular.
While presenting a good number of new findings, this paper poses challenges and puzzles
in search of hidden forces driving the evolution of the yield curve shape. Future research
cries out for a unifying economic theory to explain the recession predictive power of the yield
curve. Among the puzzles, the time-varying pattern of recession shape signals is perhaps
most intriguing. Moreover, would the shape of the yield curve reflect underlying states of
the economy? How do risk premia vary across the shapes?
The lack of data limits our shape identification of the Treasury yield curve for the first half
of the 20 century. Future research can extend the data further back and seek more evidence
on the links between the yield curve shape and the recession. With respect to the exceptions
(the wrong and missing signals), it is more crucial to examine the policy and institutional
constraints than to test its predictability. In hindsight, the yield curve could make mistakes
but policies also distorted the market signals. To investigate the causes shaping the yield
curve over the business cycle, noises contained in the low-frequency macroeconomic data are
notoriously difficult to filter out. A promising direction is to look into high frequency data
and analyze the market microstructure. Ultimately, demand and supply of the Treasuries
determine the equilibrium term structure, hence, the shape of the yield curve.
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